"I believe in the stock exchanges," declared the New Deal lawyer Thomas G. Corcoran during a congressional hearing on the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. "I do not believe you should kill them. I do believe you should regulate them-not because I have any social philosophy in regard to the subject-but because as a sheer matter of economic wisdom they should be regulated."
Speaking not long after the Dow Jones Industrial Average had fallen 89 percent and joblessness reached 25 percent, Corcoran charged that unregulated financial markets "have cost many millions of dollars; they have cost 12,000,000 men their jobs." With the lawyer for the New York Stock Exchange glowering nearby, he defended the bill's grant of sweeping power to federal administrators. The stock exchanges "cannot be expected tamely to submit to regulation," he advised. To create a commission to regulate America's financiers and not to endow it with broad powers was to "put a baby into a cage with a tiger to regulate the tiger."
The danger was all too real that "the stock exchanges and the forces allied with stock exchanges, which are supposedly being regulated," would actually "regulate the regulators." 1 Corcoran and the other New Deal architects of securities regulation faced an old problem in American statecraft: how to endow public bureaucracies with the capacity and autonomy to address an economic calamity whose solution could only be worked out over time. In other industrial nations, university-educated aristocrats staffed royal or imperial bureaucracies that were well-entrenched long before the appearance of mass political parties. The United States, in contrast, bureaucratized after it democratized; patronage-hungry politicians and powerful organized interests already held the high ground when administrative agencies marched onto the field of economic governance. 2 The ensuing conflict had not gone well for the administrators.
In the states, lackluster appointments and intrusive judicial review had made the attempts of public utility commissions to set rates for water, gas, electric, and street railways "a failure, if not a farce." 3 The Interstate Commerce Commission had established itself as a legitimate regulator of the nation's railroads but was bewildered by the catastrophic collapse in freight tonnage after the onset of the Great Depression. 4 The Federal Trade Commission, created in 1914 with a broad mandate to check industrial combination and outlaw unfair methods of business competition, was "suffering from an advanced stage of bureaucratic rot." Legislators roamed its halls at will; federal judges routinely overturned its orders. Its mission, critics complained, had shrunk to "preventing false and misleading advertising in reference to hair restorers," "a somewhat inglorious end to a noble experiment." 
Professionalism and Progress
To anyone taking a long view, the New Deal's turn to lawyers was not surprising. A century earlier, Tocqueville had seen the legal profession as an American analogue to European aristocracies. Their "study and specialized knowledge," he wrote, gave lawyers "a rank apart in society" and made them "a somewhat privileged intellectual class" and a ready supply of public officials. The progressive intellectual Herbert Croly later concurred. "No other great people, either in classic, medieval, or modern times," Croly maintained, "has ever allowed such a professional monopoly of governmental functions." Even by American standards, however, the New Deal was exceptionally a "lawyer's deal," to quote the historian Jerold Auerbach. "Not in any preceding administration had there been such dependence upon lawyers' skills or such affinity for lawyers' values." 9 And even by New Deal standards, the regulation of securities was exceptionally the work of a legal elite--lawyers who had either worked in large corporate law firms or at least had the credentials to do so, namely, top grades at law schools that employing the case method system of instruction, usually identified as Harvard, Columbia, and Yale.
The New Deal lawyers brought a great deal to securities regulation; they also had a great deal to learn on the job. What they brought, in addition to "Wall-Street-grade" legal talent, was Street "got out of the storm cellar of fear" and "began a systematic campaign to undermine the essentials of the Act." Frankfurter was particularly angered by their "bleating" that the 1933 act "curbs legitimate investment business because no conscientious man can really undertake to make himself responsible for many of the facts as to which presentations must be made" in a registration statement. "There is no question," Frankfurter told FDR, "but that the leading bankers and big law firms are trying to create a bankers' strike." 13 As the law professor John C. Coffee, Jr., has written, the crucial provision that sped acceptance of the new statute was the defense it gave to bankers, officers, and directors who unwittingly made a material misstatement after having conducted "a reasonable investigation"
and acquired "reasonable grounds" to believe its accuracy. The businesspeople, in turn, counted on their lawyers to conduct the "due diligence" investigations that immunized them from suit.
Due diligence quickly became "the mainstay of securities practice," Coffee observes, "a Full Employment Act for law firms." 14 jeopardy." The securities lawyer, Dean declared, should "endeavor to the best of his ability to see that no essentially important element is concealed from the buying public"; he must insist "that all of his questions be answered fully, fairly and frankly and that no avenues of investigation be closed to him"; and he must banish "'Weasel' wording" from prospectuses "to help the investor." 17 Wall Street lawyers "did all they could to assist us in achieving a reasonable result without lousing up the delicate financial machinery" of the securities industry, the second-in-command of the SEC's Trading and Exchange Division recalled. 18 At length, some of the lawyers' more uncompromising clients wondered what had happened to the ideal of zealous advocacy. After being blasted in the Investment Banker for "selling the investment banking industry down the river in order to get the Investment Trust bill" through Congress,
Dean ruefully wrote to Chairman Jerome Frank that "we will just have to have thick skins and grin and bear it." He did not want anything to disturb "the very cordial relations which are being established between the Securities and Exchange Commission and the investment banking community." 19 Dean struck such a cordial tone because he saw Frank not just as an officeholder but also a professional peer, for Frank had been a masterful corporate reorganizer in Chicago and New York City. Much the same could be said for the corporate bar's view of the SEC as a whole. If, as the political scientist Daniel Carpenter has argued, successful administrators typically choose a governing metaphor that "defines the self-understanding of the agency as well as the view of the agency which prevails among those actors who oversee and interact with it," the SEC chose the law firm. 20 Lawyers constituted a majority of the five-person commission throughout the 1930s; in 1940 every division head (save publicity and research) was legally trained, each division had "a heavy quota of attorneys in key jobs," and the Legal Division itself accounted for a further ninety-five lawyers. 21 As a rule, the SEC used the same meritocratic standard the law firms employed in selecting their associates, academic performance at elite law schools. (The trick, a general counsel explained, was to get to "crackerjack law students" before they "heard too many of the siren-songs of the well-flunkeyed metropolitan law shops." The typical SEC lawyer adopted the work habits of a law firm associate rather than the clockwatching that prevailed at "old-line" agencies. 24 Entry-level salaries often exceeded those of the law firms, and although a disparity would emerge and grow the longer they stayed in government, the SEC's lawyers still found consolation in knowing that they were "working on the side of the angels" and had weightier responsibilities than classmates who were still "carrying their 'bosses' briefcases" in the firms. 25 There was much to be done. The "esprit de corps" was high, and of course the opportunities, particularly for a younger lawyer, unlimited.
The corporate bar grumbled about the youthfulness and brashness of many of the agency's lawyers. "Elderly financial practitioners think of the SEC as a place full of rookie traffic cops out making a record at the expense of sedate Sunday drivers," reported a business journalist. Presumably many were also put off by having to negotiate with the Legal Division's Jews and Catholics, who, because of their ethnicity, would have been denied a job at their firms. 27 Still, the ability of the SEC's lawyers meant that the Wall Street bar met them as members of a shared professional community in which new norms of financial probity could take root and grow. 28 
Political Learning
The corporate bar's acceptance of the securities regulation was not just a sociological development; it took a political event, the emergence of a coalition of New Deal lawyers and professional politicians, to force through the laws that finally convinced the Wall Street lawyers that their world had changed. In 1933, at least, the lawyers were very much the junior members of the coalition because of their near-total ignorance of party politics. Few knew how to obtain a political endorsement for their own job; as Vice President John N. Garner complained, they were "boys who had never worked a precinct." 29 Roosevelt, populist Democrats, and progressive
Republicans put securities regulation on the legislative agenda; they voiced popular outrage and used their knowledge of congressional deal-making to get the SEC's statutes and substantial appropriations passed. Before long, however, the SEC's lawyers developed their own expertise in the use of political power. In part this was a process of fashioning a modus vivendi with professional politicians, but it was also "political learning" in a more technical sense, "the capacity to draw upon administrative resources of information, analysis, and expertise for new policy lessons and appropriate conclusions on increasingly complex issues." 30 SEC's lawyers, accountants, economists, statisticians, and other experts collected data on stock issues, the practices of broker-dealers and stock exchanges, and many other financial matters, which they used to write regulations, to create and perfect regulatory techniques, to bring enforcement proceedings, and to draft legislation expanding the agency jurisdiction.
Such "entrepreneurial policy innovation" has been identified as a hallmark of "autonomous" bureaucracies, but the SEC's initiatives took hold only as long as they addressed the partisan needs of their allies in Congress and the presidency. 31 In its fullest sense, then, the New Deal's system of securities regulation was a collaboration of professionalism and partisanship. The limits of what the collaboration could accomplish were reached by the end of 1939, after which policymakers subordinated concern for investors and the containment of finance capitalism to mobilization for war. 32 The historian Lizabeth Cohen has argued that the New Deal's "growing attentiveness to consumers" was one way of "institutionalizing and protecting the public interest." "Empowering consumers to speak for the public became a way of mitigating the power of other political blocs," Cohen observed. It also permitted the New Deal to "resuscitate a severely damaged economy while still preserving the free enterprise system." 33 Ceteris paribus, Cohen's observation for consumers holds true for Franklin D.
Roosevelt's solicitude for investors. In his acceptance speech at the Democratic National Convention, Roosevelt endorsed the platform's call for the regulation of utility and other holding companies, the control of stock exchanges, and the separation of commercial banks from brokerdealers and investment banks to "protect the savings of the country from the dishonesty of crooks and from the lack of honor so common in high financial places." ("We know well that in our complicated, interrelated credit structure if any one of these credit groups collapses"-he had mentioned municipal and corporate bonds, mortgages, and railroad securities-"they may all collapse. Danger to one is danger to all.") 34 In his first inaugural address, with a bow to Justice Louis Brandeis, he called for "an end to speculation with other people's money"; in a message to Congress he similarly insisted that "those who manage banks, corporations, and other agencies handling or using other people's money are trustees acting for others." 35 In March 1934
Roosevelt called for the regulation of stock exchanges to protect "the average investor, who is of necessity personally uninformed," from the "unnecessary, unwise, and destructive speculation" he settled upon the idea that the "investing public" no longer controlled the corporations it nominally owned and therefore required the help of "impartial and expert" administrators. 38 This was very much the view of the New Deal lawyers who drafted securities legislation and administered it at the Securities and Exchange Commission. 39 Many in Congress also championed securities laws as the best way to "restrict the gambling activities of a small group of men who have no interest in the welfare of the Nation, but who, regardless of the effect everybody knew it would have on the conditions of the country, ruthlessly manipulated the markets and brought about the conditions from which the Nation is now suffering." 40 Yet had the diffuse interests of investors been the only political force behind securities legislation, Congress would not have been able to pass so much of it over the concentrated opposition of investment bankers, stock exchanges, and utility companies. The SEC owed its successes in the 1930s not simply to its able lawyers or the protests of investors but also to congressmen from "sparsely settled" states, "colonized by New York capital." 41 In particular, as Corcoran recalled, the anti-colonialism pitch to the Texans to get free of the domination of New York and Chicago finance made them the prime movers in the legislation to regulate the investment houses, the stock exchanges, and the utility holding companies." "Taken together these two fellows made the brightest man I ever saw," he enthused. "They never insisted on their own views. When I told them what I wanted, they started to work to put it into legislation, and they wrote it in such a way as to make it stick." 45 The regulation "might drive the exchanges to Montreal"; today "regulatory arbitrage" by corporations seeking the most congenial market for their securities is a well-recognized phenomenon, and international bodies are trying to head off a global race to the bottom. 58 In the 1930s corporate law firms had stable and extensive relationships with investment bankers and corporations; since 1970 they often handle only a part of a complicated financial matter, while an in-house general counsel screens their view of the client. 59 Within government, lawyers no longer have the making and implementation of securities policy largely to themselves; in particular, the rise of risk management has shifted authority to economists and other more quantitatively adept professionals. Congress has much greater "legislative capacity" since the days when it needed Frankfurter's proteges to produce securities bills for it, but its members have to negotiate a more complicated committee system and build larger campaign war-chests than Sam Rayburn could have imagined-including, by one reckoning, contributions of over $7 million from hedge funds to congressional candidates in the 2008 election. 60 That said, the New Deal era of securities regulation may well be a source of potentially useful analogies for policymaking today. First, it suggests that policy makers might consider how the New Dealers designed securities regulation to give gatekeeping professionals in the private sector a financial and intellectual stake in the new system. In all likelihood, we will continue to need professionals in the private sector to acquire information and interpret rules and orders for their regulated clients; our regulatory scheme should be designed to let them do this comprehensively and authoritatively. Further, because any regulatory scheme is bound to be imperfect and incomplete at birth, it will take a village of private practitioners and government officials to bring it to maturity. 61 Such a collective project is most likely to emerge and its premises become part of a shared professional identity if the government's professionals are as talented as their private counterparts.
Second, the New Deal experience suggests the importance of fashioning a durable collaboration between agencies and their congressional and presidential supporters. Congress had to alter the balance of power to change the hearts and minds of "the Street." The New
Dealers who drafted the securities acts quickly learned to address the partisan needs of their legislative sponsors as well as the economic logic of securities markets, not simply to pass the law but also to create a lasting constituency for the agency in Congress. In the 73rd and 74th
Congresses, those needs were not limited to the protection of investors; they included Southern and Western grievances, dating from the nineteenth century, against Eastern capital. Very few of the Ivy-League-trained lawyers who created or staffed the SEC could claim that populist legacy as a birthright, but just as the drafters of the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 saw to it that, in Landis's phrase, the "Granger viewpoint" was embodied in its provisions, so did the architects of the 1933 and 1934 acts tried to infuse the commitments of its congressional majority into the statutes. 62 They gave the SEC the capacity for political learning not to put it beyond the reach of partisan politics but to ensure that it engaged with partisan politics on favorable terms. Decades after its creation, the SEC continued to advance the enacting coalition's goal of regulating finance capitalism "in the public interest or for the protection of investors." 63
